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Abstract
Local differential privacy (LDP) can provide each user with strong privacy guar-
antees under untrusted data curators while ensuring accurate statistics derived
from privatized data. Due to its powerfulness, LDP has been widely adopted
to protect privacy in various tasks (e.g., heavy hitters discovery, probability es-
timation) and systems (e.g., Google Chrome, Apple iOS). Although ǫ-LDP has
been proposed for many years, the more general notion of (ǫ, δ)-LDP has only
been studied in very few papers, which mainly consider mean estimation for
numeric data. Besides, prior solutions achieve (ǫ, δ)-LDP by leveraging Gaus-
sian mechanism, which leads to low accuracy of the aggregated results. In this
paper, we propose novel mechanisms that achieve (ǫ, δ)-LDP with high utility in
data analytics and machine learning. Specifically, we first design (ǫ, δ)-LDP al-
gorithms for collecting multi-dimensional numeric data, which can ensure higher
accuracy than the optimal Gaussian mechanism while guaranteeing strong pri-
vacy for each user. Then, we investigate different local protocols for categorical
attributes under (ǫ, δ)-LDP. Furthermore, we conduct theoretical analysis on
the error bound and variance of the proposed algorithms. Experimental results
on real and synthetic datasets demonstrate the high data utility of our proposed
algorithms on both simple data statistics and complex machine learning models.
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1. Introduction
With the rapid development of sensing technology [26], smart devices, such
as mobile phones, smart vehicles, wearable devices, and sensor networks, have
increasingly developed into data sources of the era of big data and generated
gigantic data continuously [28, 36]. Various and massive user data are col-
lected and analyzed to provide invaluable knowledge for different organizations
or service providers, which significantly benefits human’s daily lives. However,
privacy concerns related to user’s personal information have been serious chal-
lenges when collecting and analyzing user’s sensing data under untrusted data
curators (such as in untrusted crowdsourcing systems) [55, 30, 23, 43].
As a formal privacy protection technique, differential privacy (DP) [19, 20],
which provides rigorous guarantees for the privacy of each user by adding ran-
domized noise, has been extensively studied in the literature. Specifically, a
mechanism M achieves ǫ-DP if for any pair of neighboring datasets D and D′
(which differ in one record), it holds that P [M(D) ∈ Y ] ≤ eǫP [M(D′) ∈ Y],
where P denotes the probability and Y is any possible subset of outputs. As a
relaxed version of ǫ-DP (also referred to pure DP), (ǫ, δ)-DP [17] (also referred
to approximate DP) has the following meaning (loosely speaking, not exactly
speaking): given a typically small probability δ, a mechanismM achieves ǫ-DP
with probability at least 1 − δ. Formally speaking, a mechanism M achieves
(ǫ, δ)-DP if P [M(D) ∈ Y] ≤ eǫP [M(D′) ∈ Y ]+δ holds for any pair of neighbor-
ing datasets D and D′. (ǫ, δ)-DP can also be understood as being more general
than ǫ-DP since the former in the special case of δ = 0 becomes the latter.
Since the introduction of differential privacy (DP), a large number of DP-based
mechanisms [27, 25, 57] have been proposed and applied to numerous scenarios,
such as data statistics [54, 61, 11], learning models [1, 40, 59, 38], and systems
[29, 6]. Nonetheless, the traditional differential privacy paradigm under cen-
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tralized setting [19] requires a trustworthy data curator and can not guarantee
the privacy of each participate locally when collecting data, thus limiting its
applications when facing untrusted data curators.
Given the above discussions, local differential privacy (LDP) [33, 15] has been
proposed to provide stronger privacy guarantees locally for each user, which no
longer relies on a trustworthy data curator. Formally, for any neighboring input
tuples x and x′ of one user, the mechanism M satisfies ǫ-LDP if P[M(x) ∈
Y] ≤ eǫ ·P[M(x′) ∈ Y], for any possible subset of outputs Y. That is, each user
utilizes a LDP-achieving mechanism to perturb her/his data and then sends
the noisy information to the aggregator. Then, the aggregator combines the
perturbed data of all users to estimate the desired statistics. Thus, LDP achieves
stronger privacy guarantees than centralized DP for protecting users’ data and
also protects the aggregator from data breaches since the aggregator does not
hold users’ true data. Besides, LDP model also ensures that the data of each
participating user is invisible to any other users except the participating user.
LDP has attracted much attention in both academia and industry. A large
number of studies have designed mechanisms under ǫ-LDP for various tasks
including heavy hitters discovery, probability distribution estimation, empirical
risk minimization [41, 56, 12, 47, 5, 49, 46]. Google’s system called RAPPOR
[21] under ǫ-LDP has been used in Chrome to collect information about users’
preferred homepages. Apple [13, 44] has implemented LDP in recent iOS and
MacOS versions. Microsoft [14] has deployed an LDP-enabled data collection
mechanism in Windows Insiders program to collect application usage statistics.
Although LDP has drawn much attention from the research community in
recent years, almost existing mechanisms are proposed under ǫ-LDP. The fun-
damental research on (ǫ, δ)-LDP (the relaxed version of ǫ-LDP) has not been
addressed sufficiently. Moreover, existing solutions mainly [24, 31, 8, 4] leverage
the basic Gaussian mechanism [17] to achieve (ǫ, δ)-LDP, which yields a low
data utility. We will also demonstrate later that the data utility still remains
low even the optimal Gaussian mechanism [3] is used. Besides, existing local
protocols under (ǫ, δ)-LDP [24, 31, 4] mainly focus on the task of mean esti-
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mation for numeric attributes, without considering the frequency estimation of
categorical attributes.
The purpose of this paper is to propose mechanisms that can achieve (ǫ, δ)-LDP
with high accuracy on various estimation tasks. In particular, we focus on ap-
plying (ǫ, δ)-LDP to complex multi-dimensional data collection and analysis for
numeric attributes and categorical attributes. Our main contributions are sum-
marized as follows.
• First, we propose novel mechanisms for collecting and analyzing multi-
dimensional numeric data under (ǫ, δ)-LDP, which ensures much higher
accuracies than Gaussian mechanism. Besides, we also give the theoretical
analysis on the error bound of our proposed mechanisms.
• Second, as for categorical attributes, we investigate several different ran-
domized response protocols which achieve (ǫ, δ)-LDP and also compare the
variance of different protocols. Furthermore, we introduce an optimized
local hash mechanism under (ǫ, δ)-LDP which achieves lower communica-
tion overhead and higher accuracy than other mechanisms.
• Third, we conduct extensive experiments on both real-world datasets and
synthetic datasets to evaluate the performance of our proposed mecha-
nisms. All the experimental results have demonstrated the high accuracy
of our proposed mechanisms on both mean/frequency estimations and
machine learning models.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related work. Sec-
tion 3 formalizes the research problem and introduces local differential privacy
as preliminaries. In Sections 4 and 5, we elaborate our proposed algorithms for
numeric attributes and categorical attributes, respectively. Section 6 presents
our extensive experimental results. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
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2. Related Work
Differential privacy (DP) [19, 20], a classical privacy protection technique
with rigorous mathematical proofs, has been studied in the literature for more
than a decade. It provides formal privacy guarantees for each record in the
dataset [54, 61, 11, 57]. One of the many topics in DP research is differentially
private empirical risk minimization for machine learning [18, 10], especially for
deep neural networks [1, 40, 59, 2, 53]. Also, novel privacy notions related to
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy such as concentrated differential privacy have also been
studied recently [9, 37, 7]. However, traditional DP in the centralized setting
requires a trusted data curator, thereby limiting the application scenarios.
Therefore, local differential privacy (LDP) [33, 15] has received considerable
attention recently since it no longer assumes a trusted data curator. Specifi-
cally, each user applies LDP to protect her/his local information and reports
only the noisy data to an aggregator. This is in the same spirit as the classi-
cal randomized response technique [52]. LDP not only provides strong privacy
guarantees for each user, but also protects the aggregator from data breaches
since the aggregator does not collect users’ true data in the first place. Ka-
siviswanathan et al. [33] have precisely addressed the powerful characterization
of the local private learning algorithms. Google has developed RAPPOR [21] to
collect user statistics for Chrome under ǫ-LDP with strong privacy protections
and high analysis accuracy on the collected data. Afterward, Fanti et al. [22]
extended RAPPOR to conduct complex joint distribution estimations.
Current researches focus on many related problems under the LDP model,
such as mean/frequency estimation [15, 39, 48], probability distribution esti-
mation [22, 56, 47], heavy hitter identification [5, 41, 8], itemset mining [50],
marginal distribution release [12, 60], and empirical risk minimization [46, 45].
Besides, Ye et al. [58] proposed PrivKV which investigates the frequency and
mean estimation on key-value data. And they also proposed PrivKVM which
can improve the estimation accuracy further through multiple iterations. By de-
ploying LDP to the recommended system, Shin et al. [42] proposed an enhanced
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matrix factorization mechanism which leverages random projection-based di-
mension reduction technique to improve the recommendation accuracy while
guaranteeing per-user privacy.
In the setting of (ǫ, δ)-LDP, Gaboardi et al. [24] have investigated the upper
and lower error bounds of mean estimation when protecting privacy by adding
Gaussian noise. Afterward, Joseph et al. [31] further provided a smaller lower
bound of mean estimation than Gaboardi et al. [24]. As for heavy hitter discov-
ery problem, Bun et al. [8] have focused on the transformation of approximate
local private protocol ((ǫ, δ)-LDP) into a pure local private protocol (ǫ-LDP).
Moreover, under the constraint of (ǫ, δ)-LDP, Bassily [4] proposed algorithms
for estimating a set of linear queries in both offline setting and adaptive setting
and analyzed the accuracy bound of the proposed algorithms. So far, the above
mechanisms under (ǫ, δ)-LDP are all achieved by the classical Gaussian mecha-
nism [17], which yields low accuracies of the estimation results. Thus, the goal
of this paper is to investigate the mechanisms which can achieve (ǫ, δ)-LDP with
higher accuracies on estimation results.
3. Preliminaries
This paper considers the local setting that the server collects data from a
large number of users under an untrusted data curator. Then, the collected
data will be used to compute statistical models or conduct machine learning.
Our goal is to design the mechanism which can not only achieve (ǫ, δ)-local
differential privacy (LDP) [33, 15], but also maximize the accuracies on both
statistical models and machine learning models.
Formally, let x = {x(1), x(2), · · · , x(N)} be the data of all users, where N
is the user population. Each tuple x(i) = 〈x1(i), x2(i), · · · , xd(i)〉 (i ∈ [1, N ])1
denotes the data of the i-th user, which consists of d attributes A1, A2, · · · , Ad.
Each xj(i) (j ∈ [1, d]) denotes the value of the j-th attribute of the i-th user.
1For simplicity, in this paper, we use i ∈ [1, N ] and j ∈ [1, d] to denote the sets i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N} and j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , d}, respectively.
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These attributes are either numeric or categorical. Without loss of generality, we
assume that each numeric attribute holds a domain [−1, 1], and each categorical
has k distinct values, holding a discrete domain {1, 2, · · · , k}.
While collecting users’ multi-dimensional data under an untrusted data cu-
rator, each user ui adopts a randomized perturbation mechanismM to perturb
her tuple x(i). Then, the perturbed data M(x(i)) instead of raw data will be
sent to the aggregator in order to protect privacy information locally against
an untrusted aggregator. This paper follows the local differential privacy model
and focuses on two types of analytic tasks under (ǫ, δ)-LDP:
1. Basic statistics: mean estimation and frequency estimation. For numeric
attribute, we focus on estimating the mean value of each attribute Aj(j ∈
[1, d]) over all N users, that is 1N
∑N
i=1 xj(i). As for categorical attribute,
the frequency fj(k) of each possible value k(k ∈ [1, k]) in attribute A′j will
be computed.
2. Advanced statistics: machine learning models analysis under empirical
risk minimization.
Next, we briefly review some conceptions related to (ǫ, δ)-local differential
privacy and machine learning. In the following, we simplify x(i) as x to denote
the data tuple of one user by omitting notation i.
3.1. Local Differential Privacy
Local differential privacy [33, 15] has been used to provide strong privacy
protection for each user locally, which is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (ǫ-Local Differential Privacy [33]). A randomized mechanism M
satisfies ǫ-local differential privacy if and only if for any pairs of adjacent input
tuples x and x′ in the domain of M, and for any possible subset of outputs Y,
it always holds
P[M(x) ∈ Y] ≤ eǫ · P[M(x′) ∈ Y], (1)
where the notation P[·] denotes probability.
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Similar to the case that (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy [17] is a relaxation of ǫ-
differential privacy [19], (ǫ, δ)-local differential privacy (also called approximate
LDP) is a relaxation of ǫ-local differential privacy (also called pure LDP).
Definition 2 ((ǫ, δ)-Local Differential Privacy [4]). A randomized mechanism
M satisfies (ǫ, δ)-local differential privacy if and only if for any pairs of adjacent
input tuples x and x′ in the domain of M, and for any possible subset of outputs
Y, it always holds
P[M(x) ∈ Y] ≤ eǫ · P[M(x′) ∈ Y] + δ, (2)
where δ is typically small. Loosely speaking (not exactly speaking), (ǫ, δ)-LDP
means that a mechanism M achieves ǫ-LDP with probability at least 1− δ. By
relaxing ǫ-LDP, (ǫ, δ)-LDP is more general since the latter in the special case
of δ = 0 becomes the former.
3.2. Machine Learning based on Empirical Risk Minimization
Machine learning models, which can be expressed as empirical risk mini-
mization essentially, have been applied to many fields recent years. As for a
machine learning task with N training samples x = {x(1), x(2), · · · , x(N)}, the
loss function L(θ) is used to capture how “bad” is the predictor when predict-
ing the label of the i-th data point, which is parameterized by a d-dimensional
parameter vector θ and computed as the average loss of all samples. That is,
L(θ) = 1N
∑
i L(θ, x(i)), where L(θ, x(i)) is the loss of sample x(i). Generally,
the training target is to find a θ that obtains an acceptably small loss. In prac-
tice, the stochastic gradient descent (SGD) algorithm is often used to compute
the target θ where we have the minimum (or hopefully) loss. At each iteration
t + 1, the parameter vector is computed as θt+1 = θt − η · ∇L(θt), where η is
the learning rate, ∇L(θt) is the gradient of loss function L(θt) at θt.
When in private settings, each user will submit a noisy gradient ∇L∗(i) to
the aggregator. In this paper, we assume that each iteration involves a batch G
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of users. Then, the parameter will be updated as
θt+1 = θt − η · 1|G|
∑
i∈G
∇L∗(i), (3)
where |G| is the batch size.
3.3. Existing Solutions to Achieve (ǫ, δ)-LDP
The Gaussian mechanism is a classical solution for achieving (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy [17], which can also be applied to achieve (ǫ, δ)-local differential pri-
vacy. Most existing studies on (ǫ, δ)-LDP are based on the Gaussian mechanism
[24, 31, 8, 4]. Balle and Wang [3] have shown that the two classical Gaussian
mechanisms of Dwork and Roth [20] and of Dwork et al. [17] for (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy are not optimal. Moreover, they also developed the optimal Gaussian
mechanism. Hence, we will discuss the optimal Gaussian mechanism in this
paper and its application to (ǫ, δ)-LDP.
Theorem 1 (Optimal Gaussian mechanism (Opt-GM) for (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy [3]). The optimal Gaussian mechanism for (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy
adds Gaussian noise with standard deviation σ to each dimension of a query
with ℓ2-sensitivity ∆, for σ given by
σ =
(
ξ +
√
ξ2 + ǫ
)
·∆
ǫ
√
2
, (4)
where ℓ2-sensitivity of a query is the maximal ℓ2-norm difference of the true
query results on neighboring datasets which differ in just one record, ξ is the
solution of erfc (ξ) − eǫ erfc
(√
ξ2 + ǫ
)
= 2δ and erfc() is the complementary
error function.
Then, each user’s data will be perturbed by adding randomized Gaussian
noise, that is, x∗(i) = x(i) + 〈N (0, σ2)〉d, where N (0, σ2) denotes a random
variable following a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2. Since
we assume each user’s data lies in range [−1, 1], thus ℓ2-sensitivity is ∆ = 2.
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Figure 1: The worst-case noise variances for one-dimensional numeric data.
Clearly, the estimation for x∗(i) is unbiased since the injected Gaussian noises
have zero mean. Besides, the worst-case variance is σ2. As shown in Fig. 1,
we plot the worst-case noise variances of the optimal Gaussian mechanism and
our solution (will be introduced later) for one-dimensional numeric data versus
different privacy parameters. It can be observed our solution has much smaller
variances than the optimal Gaussian mechanism especially when ǫ is small (i.e.,
the degree of privacy protection is high). This demonstrates that our solution
can ensure high accuracy in reality while providing strong privacy guarantees.
4. Mean Estimation for Numeric Attributes under (ǫ, δ)-LDP
This section introduces the solutions to achieve (ǫ, δ)-local differential pri-
vacy on multi-dimensional numeric attributes for mean estimation.
4.1. Our First Solution for Multiple Numeric Attributes under (ǫ, δ)-LDP
Under ǫ-LDP, Duchi et at. [16] have proposed a classical randomized mech-
anism for numeric data which has been extended to many scenarios. However,
Nguyeˆn et al. [39] have pointed that Duchi et al.’s solution doesn’t achieve
ǫ-LDP when d is even. But they don’t give the specific proofs. We show
Duchi et at.’s solution in Appendix A.1 (e.g., Algorithm 4) and give the proofs.
Moreover, this paper has also fixed this problem by re-defining the probability
of sampling a Bernoulli variable u and shown the proofs in Appendix A.2 of the
online full version [51] due to space limitation.
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In what follows, inspired by Duchi et al.’s work, we propose a randomized
mechanism on multiple numeric attributes for achieving (ǫ, δ)-LDP. Firstly, we
present and prove the Lemma 1 that will be used later to ensure (ǫ, δ)-LDP.
Lemma 1. For a randomized mechanism M whose outputs are discrete, M
satisfies (ǫ, δ)-local differential privacy if and only if for any pairs of adjacent
input tuples x and x′ in the domain of M, and for any possible output x∗, it
always holds
P[M(x) = x∗] ≤ eǫ · P[M(x′) = x∗] + δ. (5)
And Eq. (2) and Eq. (5) is equivalent to each other.
Proof. For Eq. (2) ⇒ Eq. (5), this can be easily achieved by letting Y = {x∗}.
For Eq. (5) ⇒ Eq. (2), we have
P [M(x) ∈ Y] =
∑
x∗∈Y
P [M(x) = x∗]
≤
∑
x∗∈Y
(
eǫP
[
M(x′) = x∗
]
+ δ
)
=
( ∑
x∗∈Y
eǫP
[
M(x′) = x∗
])
+ |Y| · δ
≤ P
[
M(x′) ∈ Y
]
+ δ. (6)
Thus, it has proved Eq. (2) ⇔ Eq. (5). 
Followed the definition before, each user’s d-dimensional data is denoted as
x = (x1, x2, · · · , xd) (We will omit the notation i in the analysis for simplicity
since we focus on one arbitrary user i here). And each xj ∈ [−1, 1] is the
value of the j-th attribute Aj , where j ∈ [1, d]. Under (ǫ, δ)-LDP, each user’s
data x ∈ [−1, 1]d will be perturbed into x∗ ∈ {−B,B}d, where B is a constant
decided by d, ǫ and δ. Before chosen B, we first compute Cd as
Cd =


2d−1, if d is odd,
2d−1 − 12
(
d
d/2
)
, otherwise.
(7)
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Algorithm 1: Mechanism for Multi-dimensional Numeric Data under
(ǫ, δ)-LDP (Mechanism-1)
Input: tuple x ∈ [−1, 1]d and privacy parameters ǫ and δ
Output: perturbed tuple x∗ ∈ {−B,B}d
1 Generate a random vector V := [V1, V2, . . . , Vd] ∈ {−1, 1}
d by sampling each Vj
independently from the following distribution:
P[Vj = vj ] =
{
1
2
+ 1
2
xj , if vj = 1
1
2
− 1
2
xj , if vj = −1
2 In the case of V is sampled as v, let T+(v) (resp. T−(v)) be the set of all
tuples x∗ ∈ {−B,B}d such that x∗ · v > 0 (resp. x∗ · v ≤ 0);
3 Sample a Bernoulli variable u = 1 with probability α, for α given by Eq. (24),
i.e., α :=
{
eǫ+Cd·δ
eǫ+1
, if d is odd,
eǫ·Cd+δ·Cd(2
d−Cd)
(eǫ−1)Cd+2
d , if d is even.
for
Cd :=
{
2d−1, if d is odd,
2d−1 − 1
2
(
d
d/2
)
, otherwise.
;
4 if u = 1 then
5 return a tuple x∗ uniformly from T+(v);
6 else
7 return a tuple x∗ uniformly from T−(v);
Then, B is calculated by
B =


2d+Cd·(eǫ−1)
( d−1(d−1)/2)·(eǫ+2d·δ−1)
, if d is odd,
2d+Cd·(eǫ−1)
(d−1d/2)·(eǫ+2d·δ−1)
, otherwise.
(8)
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo-code of our mechanism. It firstly discretizes
the d-dimensional data into V ∈ {−1, 1}d which will be used to sample T+(v)
and T−(v). Then, a noisy tuple will be returned based on the value of a Bernoulli
variable u, where the probability of u = 1 is α.
In what follows, we will show the computation of α while achieving (ǫ, δ)-LDP.
Firstly, we analyze the size of T+(v) and T−(v). Recall that T+(v) (resp.
T−(v)) is the set of all tuples x∗ ∈ {−B,B}d such that x∗ · v > 0 (resp.
x∗ · v ≤ 0). The analysis includes two cases, e.g., d is odd and d is even.
Case 1: d is odd. Since v ∈ {−1, 1}d and x∗ ∈ {−B,B}d, suppose there
are k positions that vectors x∗ and v have the same sign (i.e., d − k positions
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have the different sign). Therefore, once v is sampled based on the input x, it
can easily know that x∗ · v > 0 will be guaranteed if and only if k > d− k (i.e.,
k ≥ (d + 1)/2 since d is odd), and x∗ · v ≤ 0 will be guaranteed if and only if
k ≤ d− k (i.e., k ≤ (d− 1)/2). Therefore, when d is odd, it holds
∣∣T+(v)∣∣ = ∑
j≥ d+12
(
d
j
)
,
∣∣T−(v)∣∣ = ∑
j≤ d−12
(
d
j
)
. (9)
From Eq. (9), it can be observed that |T+(v)| = |T−(v)| since d is odd. Recall
that |T+(v)|+ |T−(v)| = 2d, thus we can obtain
∣∣T+(v)∣∣ = ∣∣T−(v)∣∣ = 2d−1, if d is odd. (10)
As we can seen, the size of both |T+(v)| and |T−(v)| is independent of v.
Thus, when given input x′ and sampled v′, it will hold |T+(v′)| = |T+(v)|
and |T−(v′)| = |T−(v)|.
Case 2: d is even. Same as Case 1, assume there are k positions that
vectors x∗ and v have the same sign (i.e., d − k positions have the different
sign). Therefore, we can know that x∗ · v > 0 will be guaranteed if and only if
k > d− k (i.e., k ≥ (d+ 2)/2 since d is even), and x∗ · v ≤ 0 will be guaranteed
if and only if k ≤ d− k (i.e., k ≤ d/2). Hence, when d is even, it holds
∣∣T+(v)∣∣ = ∑
j≥ d+22
(
d
j
)
,
∣∣T−(v)∣∣ = ∑
j≤ d2
(
d
j
)
. (11)
Base on Eq. (11), it holds that |T+(v)|+ |T−(v)| = 2d and |T−(v)| − |T+(v)| =(
d
d/2
)
. Thus, we can get


|T+(v)| = 2d−1 − 12
(
d
d/2
)
,
|T−(v)| = 2d−1 + 12
(
d
d/2
)
.
(12)
Assume that we sample a Bernoulli variable u = 1 with probability α (note
that α > 1/2) in our mechanism. Thus, given a perturbed output x∗ of input
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x, it holds
P[M(x) = x∗] = αP[M(x) = x∗ | u = 1] + (1− α)P[M(x) = x∗ | u = 0]
=
{ ∑
v∈{−1,1}d
[
αP[x∗ ∈ T+(v)] + (1− α)P[x∗ ∈ T−(v)]
]
× P[v | x]
}
=
{ ∑
v∈{−1,1}d
[
αP[x∗ ∈ T+(v)] + (1− α)P[x∗ ∈ T−(v)]
]
×
d∏
j=1
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)}
=
{ ∑
v∈{−1,1}d
[
α
|T+(v)|
× 1[x∗ ∈ T+(v)] +
1− α
|T−(v)|
× 1[x∗ ∈ T−(v)]
]
×
d∏
j=1
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)}
=
{ ∑
v∈{−1,1}d
[
α
|T+(v)|
× 1[x∗ · v > 0] +
1− α
|T−(v)|
× 1[x∗ · v ≤ 0]
]
×
d∏
j=1
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)}
=
{ ∑
v∈{−1,1}d:
x∗·v>0
[
α
|T+(v)|
×
d∏
j=1
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)]}
+
{ ∑
v∈{−1,1}d:
x∗·v≤0
[
1− α
|T−(v)|
×
d∏
j=1
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)]}
.
(13)
In the same way, given a perturbed output x∗ of input x′, it can also get
P[M(x′) = x∗] = αP[M(x′) = x∗ | u = 1] + (1− α)P[M(x′) = x∗ | u = 0]
=
{ ∑
v′∈{−1,1}d
[
αP[x∗ ∈ T+(v′)] + (1− α)P[x∗ ∈ T−(v′)]
]
× P[v′ | x]
}
=
{ ∑
v′∈{−1,1}d:
x∗·v′>0
[
α
|T+(v′)|
×
d∏
j=1
(
1
2
+
1
2
x′j · v
′
j
)]}
+
{ ∑
v′∈{−1,1}d:
x∗·v′≤0
[
1− α
|T−(v′)|
×
d∏
j=1
(
1
2
+
1
2
x′j · v
′
j
)]}
.
(14)
In order to satisfy (ǫ, δ)-local differential privacy, it needs to ensure for any
x ∈ [−1, 1]d and x′ ∈ [−1, 1]d that Eq. (5) is always satisfied for any output
x∗ ∈ Y. Thus, it can be seen that as long as Eq. (5) is satisfied when P[M(x) =
x∗] takes the maximum value and P[M(x′) = x∗] takes the minimum value,
then mechanism M(·) will satisfy (ǫ, δ)-local differential privacy. Here and in
the following, we may omit v in the |T+(v)| and |T−(v)| for simplicity since the
size of them is independent of v.
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Lemma 2. The Eq. (13) will take the maximum value when
x ∈ {v : v ∈ {−1, 1}d, x∗ · v > 0}, (15)
and the maximum value is
maxP[M(x) = x∗] = α|T+(v)| . (16)
And, the Eq. (14) will take the minimum value when
x′ ∈ {v′ : v′ ∈ {−1, 1}d, x∗ · v′ ≤ 0}, (17)
and the minimum value is
minP[M(x′) = x∗] = 1− α|T−(v′)| . (18)
Proof. Eq. (13) can be induced as
P[M(x) = x∗] ={ ∑
v∈{−1,1}d:
x∗·v>0
[
α
|T+(v)|
×
d∏
j=1
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)]}
+
{ ∑
v∈{−1,1}d:
x∗·v≤0
[
1− α
|T−(v)|
×
d∏
j=1
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)]}
=
{
α
|T+|
∑
v∈{−1,1}d :
x∗·v>0
d∏
j=1
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)}
+
{
1− α
|T−|
∑
v∈{−1,1}d:
x∗·v≤0
d∏
j=1
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)}
. (19)
It can be seen that
∑
v∈{−1,1}d :
x∗·v>0
d∏
j=1
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)
+
∑
v∈{−1,1}d:
x∗·v≤0
d∏
j=1
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)
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=
∑
v∈{−1,1}d
d∏
j=1
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)
=
d∏
j=1
[(
1
2
+
1
2
xj
)
+
(
1
2
−
1
2
xj
)]
=
d∏
j=1
1 = 1. (20)
We define A as
∑
v∈{−1,1}d:
x∗·v>0
∏d
j=1
(
1
2 +
1
2xj · vj
)
. Then
∑
v∈{−1,1}d:
x∗·v≤0
∏d
j=1
(
1
2 +
1
2xj · vj
)
equals 1−A. Thus, Eq. (13) can be deduced as
P[M(x) = x∗] = α|T+| · A+
1− α
|T−| · (1−A). (21)
Given α > 1/2 and |T+| ≤ |T−|, it follows that α|T+| > 1−α|T+| ≥ 1−α|T−| . Since(
1
2 +
1
2xj · vj
) ≥ 0 for any xj ∈ [−1, 1], vj ∈ {−1, 1}, and j ∈ [1, d], then both
A and 1−A are non-negative. Then, it holds 0 ≤ A ≤ 1.
Therefore, the maximum value of A is 1, and the minimum value of A is
0. Then, the Eq. (21) will take the maximum value when A = 1 and take the
minimum value when A = 0. Since A =
∑
v∈{−1,1}d:
x∗·v>0
∏d
j=1
(
1
2 +
1
2xj · vj
)
and
x ∈ [−1, 1]d, we can easily know that A = 1 if x ∈ {v : v ∈ {−1, 1}d, x∗ · v > 0}.
And, A = 0 if x ∈ {v : v ∈ {−1, 1}d, x∗ · v ≤ 0}. Hence, the maximum value
of Eq. (21) is α|T+| and the minimum value of Eq. (21) is
1−α
|T−| . Similarly, it can
get the same results when given input x′. We omit the proof for brevity. 
Therefore, based on Eq. (5) and Lemma 2, to achieve (ǫ, δ)-local differential
privacy, we only need to guarantee
α
|T+| ≤
1− α
|T−| · e
ǫ + δ. (22)
By combining Eqs. (9), (11) and (22), we can obtain
α =


eǫ+|T+|·δ
eǫ+1 , if d is odd,
|T+|·eǫ+|T+|·|T−|·δ
|T+|·eǫ+|T−| , if d is even.
(23)
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By taking Eqs. (10) and (12) into Eq. (23), we can get
α =


eǫ+Cd·δ
eǫ+1 , if d is odd,
eǫ·Cd+δ·Cd(2d−Cd)
(eǫ−1)Cd+2d , if d is even.
(24)
Additionally, it should be noted that it needs to ensure Cd ·δ < 1 in Eq. (24)
in order to make α < 1.
Lemma 3. Algorithm 1 is an unbiased estimator of the input x when B is
calculated by Eq. (8).
Proof. We present the proof in Appendix A.3 of the online full version [51] due
to space limitation. 
Theorem 2. For any j ∈ [1, d], let Zj = 1N
∑N
i=1 x
∗
j (i) and Xj =
1
N
∑N
i=1 xj(i).
Then Algorithm 1 ensures that with at least 1− β probability,
max
j∈[1,d]
|Zj −Xj | = O
( √
d log(d/β)
(ǫ+ 2d · δ)√N
)
. (25)
Proof. For any dimension j ∈ [1, d] and user i ∈ [1, N ], it holds
V ar[x∗j (i)− xj(i)] = V ar[x∗j (i)] = E[(x∗j (i))2]− (E[x∗j (i)])2
=
∑
x∗j (i)
(x∗j (i))
2
P
[
x∗j (i)
]− (xj(i))2
=
∑
x∗j (i)
B2P
[
x∗j (i)
] − (xj(i))2
= B2 − (xj(i))2 ≤ B2 (26)
Since Algorithm 1 is an unbiased estimator of the input x, based on Lemma 3, it
holds |x∗j (i)− xj(i)| ≤ B + 1. Then, by the Bernstein inequality (see Definition
4.1 of [12]), we have
P [|Zj −Xj | ≥ λ] = P
[∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
{x∗j (i)− xj(i)}
∣∣∣∣ ≥ λ
]
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≤ 2 · exp
(
−
Nλ2
2
N
∑N
i=1 V ar[x
∗
j (i)− xj(i)] +
2
3
λ(B + 1)
)
= 2 · exp
(
−
Nλ2
2B2 + 2
3
λ(B + 1)
)
. (27)
Based on the union bound, it holds that
P
[
max
j∈[1,d]
|Zj −Xj | ≥ λ
]
= P [{|Z1 −X1| ≥ λ} ∪ · · · ∪ {|Zd −Xd| ≥ λ}]
≤
d∑
j=1
P [|Zj −Xj | ≥ λ]
≤ 2d · exp
(
−
Nλ2
2B2 + 2
3
λ(B + 1)
)
.
Then, to ensure that max
j∈[1,d]
|Zj −Xj | < λ holds with at least 1− β probability,
it suffices to enforce
2d · exp
(
−
Nλ2
2B2 + 2
3
λ(B + 1)
)
= β. (28)
By solving Eq. (28), we get λ = O
(
B ·√log(d/β)/√N).
We now analyze B in Eq. (8); i.e., B :=


2d+Cd·(eǫ−1)
( d−1(d−1)/2)·(eǫ+2d·δ−1)
, if d is odd,
2d+Cd·(eǫ−1)
(d−1d/2)·(eǫ+2d·δ−1)
, if d is even.
First, Cd := 2
d−1 for odd d, and Cd := 2d−1− 12
(
d
d/2
)
= 2d−1− o(2d−1) for even
and large d, where o(2d−1) represents a quantity f(d) which satisfies f(d)
2d−1 → 0
as d → ∞. Hence, we obtain 2d + Cd · (eǫ − 1) = O
(
2d−1(eǫ + 1)
)
= O
(
2d
)
for large d and small ǫ. We define the relation “∼” such that two positive
sequences f1(d) and f2(d) satisfy f1(d) ∼ f2(d) if and only if f1(d)f2(d) → 1 as
d→∞. Then for large and odd d, we obtain from Stirling’s approximation [34]
that (d − 1)! ∼ √2π · (d− 1) · (d−1e )d−1 and (d−12 )! ∼
√
2π · d−12 ·
(
d−1
2e
) d−1
2 ,
leading to
(
d−1
(d−1)/2
)
= (d−1)!
[( d−12 )!]
2
∼ 2d−1√
π(d−1)/2 ∼
2d√
d
. In a similar way, for large
and even d, we obtain
(
d−1
d/2
) ∼ 2d√
d
. For small ǫ, we have eǫ− 1 = ǫ+ o(ǫ), where
o(ǫ) represents a quantity g(ǫ) which satisfies g(ǫ)ǫ → 0 as ǫ → 0. Combining
the above results, we finally derive B = O
(
2d
2d√
d
·(ǫ+2d·δ)
)
= O
( √
d
ǫ+2d·δ
)
. Hence,
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there exists λ = O
(√
d log(d/β)
(ǫ+2d·δ)
√
N
)
such that max
j∈[1,d]
|Zj − Xj | < λ holds with at
least 1− β probability. 
Remark 1. In Algorithm 1, we select T+(v) (resp. T−(v)) be the set of all
tuples x∗ ∈ {−B,B}d such that x∗ · v > 0 (resp. x∗ · v ≤ 0). It should
be noted that we can also select T+(v) (resp. T−(v)) be the set of all tuples
x∗ ∈ {−B,B}d such that x∗ · v ≥ 0 (resp. x∗ · v < 0). In this case, when d
is odd, the result is the same as Eq. (24) since T+(v) = T−(v). But when d is
even, we have
∣∣T+(v)∣∣ = ∑
j≥ d2
(
d
j
)
,
∣∣T−(v)∣∣ = ∑
j≤ d2−1
(
d
j
)
. (29)
Thus, we can get


|T+(v)| = 2d−1 + 12
(
d
d/2
)
,
|T−(v)| = 2d−1 − 12
(
d
d/2
)
.
(30)
By taking Eqs. (10) and (30) into Eq. (23), it can obtain
α =


eǫ+Cd·δ
eǫ+1 , if d is odd,
eǫ·(2d−Cd)+δ·Cd(2d−Cd)
eǫ·(2d−Cd)+Cd , if d is even.
(31)
4.2. Our Second Solution for Multiple Numeric Attributes under (ǫ, δ)-LDP
Before introducing our second mechanism for multiple numeric attributes,
we first show the algorithm that preserves single numeric attributes under
(ǫ, δ)-LDP. Based on Algorithm 1 in Section 4.1, we can easily deduce the
(ǫ, δ)-LDP mechanism for one-dimensional numeric data. Algorithm 2 presents
the pseudo-code of the solution for one-dimensional numeric attribute under
(ǫ, δ)-LDP. It can be seen that given a tuple x ∈ [−1, 1], the algorithm returns
a perturbed tuple x∗ that equals either e
ǫ+1
eǫ+2δ−1 or − e
ǫ+1
eǫ+2δ−1 , with the following
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Algorithm 2: Mechanism for One-dimensional Numeric Data under
(ǫ, δ)-LDP
Input: tuple x ∈ [−1, 1] and privacy parameters ǫ and δ
Output: perturbed tuple x∗ ∈ {− e
ǫ+1
eǫ+2δ−1
, e
ǫ+1
eǫ+2δ−1
}
1 Sample a Bernoulli variable u such that P[u = 1] = e
ǫ+2δ−1
2(eǫ+1)
· x+ 1
2
;
2 if u = 1 then
3 x∗ = e
ǫ+1
eǫ+2δ−1
;
4 else
5 x∗ = − e
ǫ+1
eǫ+2δ−1
;
6 return x∗;
probabilities:
P[x∗ | x] =


eǫ+2δ−1
2(eǫ+1) · x+ 12 , if x∗ = e
ǫ+1
eǫ+2δ−1 ,
− eǫ+2δ−12(eǫ+1) · x+ 12 , if x∗ = − e
ǫ+1
eǫ+2δ−1 .
(32)
Theorem 3. Algorithm 2 satisfies (ǫ, δ)-local differential privacy.
We omit the proof of Theorem 3 since Algorithm 2 is the simple version of
Algorithm 1 when d = 1.
Lemma 4. Algorithm 2 is an unbiased estimator of the input value x. And,
the variance of the perturbed value x∗ in the worst-case is
V ar[x∗] =
(
eǫ + 1
eǫ + 2δ − 1
)2
. (33)
Proof. Since x∗ ∈ {− eǫ+1eǫ+2δ−1 , e
ǫ+1
eǫ+2δ−1}, the expectation of x∗ is computed as
E[x∗] =
eǫ + 1
eǫ + 2δ − 1
·
x · (eǫ + 2δ − 1) + eǫ + 1
2(eǫ + 1)
+
(
−
eǫ + 1
eǫ + 2δ − 1
)
·
−x · (eǫ + 2δ − 1) + eǫ + 1
2(eǫ + 1)
=
eǫ + 1
eǫ + 2δ − 1
·
(2x(eǫ + 2δ − 1)
2(eǫ + 1)
)
= x.
Then, the variance is computed as:
V ar[x∗] = E[(x∗)2]− (E[x∗])2
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Algorithm 3: Mechanism for Multi-dimensional Numeric Data under
(ǫ, δ)-LDP (Mechanism-2)
Input: tuple x ∈ [−1, 1]d and privacy parameters ǫ and δ
Output: perturbed tuple x∗ ∈ {− e
ǫ+1
eǫ+2δ−1
· d
k
, 0, e
ǫ+1
eǫ+2δ−1
· d
k
}d
1 Initialize x∗ = 〈0, 0, · · · , 0〉d;
2 Let k = max{1,min{d,
⌊
ǫ
τ
⌋
}};
3 Sample k values uniformly without replacement from {1, 2, · · · , d};
4 for each sampled value j in k do
5 Take xj ,
ǫ
k
and δ
k
as input to Algorithm 2 and obtain a noisy value x¯j ;
6 x∗j =
d
k
x¯j ;
7 return x∗;
=
( eǫ + 1
eǫ + 2δ − 1
)2
·
x · (eǫ + 2δ − 1) + eǫ + 1
2(eǫ + 1)
+
( −(eǫ + 1)
eǫ + 2δ − 1
)2
·
−x · (eǫ + 2δ − 1) + eǫ + 1
2(eǫ + 1)
− x2
=
( eǫ + 1
eǫ + 2δ − 1
)2
− x2. (34)
Therefore, the worst-case variance of x∗ equals to
(
eǫ+1
eǫ+2δ−1
)2
, and it occurs
when x = 0. 
Theorem 4. Let Z = 1N
∑N
i=1 x
∗(i) and X = 1N
∑N
i=1 x(i). The Algorithm 2
holds that with at least 1− β probability,
|Z −X | = O
( √
log(1/β)
(ǫ + 2δ)
√
N
)
. (35)
We omit the proof of Theorem 4 since it’s a special case of Theorem 2 when
d = 1 in Section 4.1.
When collecting multiple numeric attributes privately, a straightforward
method is to use a one-dimensional numeric data perturbation algorithm (e.g.,
Algorithm 2), such that the privacy parameters of each attribute are given as
ǫ/d and δ/d. By composition theorem [35, 33], this method satisfies (ǫ, δ)-LDP.
However, based on Theorem 4, the noise bound of each attribute will be O
(
d
√
log d
(ǫ+2δ)
√
N
)
,
which is super-linear to d. So, this solution leads to an inferior data utility es-
pecially when d becomes large.
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To address this problem, we follow the spirit of [46] to only perturb k at-
tributes instead of d attributes, which will increase the privacy budget of each
attribute from ǫ/d to ǫ/k, thus reducing the noise variance in turn. Algorithm 3
shows the pseudo-code of our extension of Algorithm 2 for multi-dimensional nu-
meric data. Given any d-dimensional tuple x ∈ [−1, 1]d, Algorithm 3 will return
a perturbed tuple x∗ with k non-zero values. Specifically, it uniformly at ran-
dom selects k attributes from all d attribute and perturbs these k-dimensional
data instead, where k is chosen by Lemma 5. Then, for each sampled dimension
j ∈ [1, k], Algorithm 3 takes xj , ǫ/k and δ/k as inputs to Algorithm 2 and
outputs a noisy value x¯j . Thus, the finally returned value is x
∗
j =
d
k x¯j .
Lemma 5. The optimal k of Algorithm 3 is chosen as
k = max{1,min{d,
⌊ ǫ
2.17
⌋
}}. (36)
Proof. For each dimension j ∈ [1, d], we can compute
E[x¯2j ] = V ar[x¯j ] + (E[x¯j ])
2 =
( e ǫk + 1
e
ǫ
k + 2δk − 1
)2
− x¯2j + x¯2j =
( e ǫk + 1
e
ǫ
k + 2δk − 1
)2
.
Then, the variance is computed as
V ar[x∗j ] = E[(x
∗
j )
2]− (E[x∗j ])2 =
k
d
E[(
d
k
x¯j)
2]− x2j =
d
k
E[x¯2j ]− x2j
=
d
k
( e ǫk + 1
e
ǫ
k + 2δk − 1
)2
− x2j . (37)
Hence, the worst-case variance is dk
(
e
ǫ
k+1
e
ǫ
k+ 2δk −1
)2
. In order to compute the
optimal k that minimizes the worst-case variance, we define a := ǫ/k and b :=
2δ/ǫ so that the worst-case variance equals dǫ · f(a), for
f(a) := a
(
ea + 1
ea + ab− 1
)2
. (38)
Thus, computing the minimum worst-case variance is equivalent to compute the
minimum value of Eq. (38). We first show that Eq. (38) has the minimum value
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since it is monotonically increasing first and then monotonically decreasing in
interval (0,+∞). The derivative of Eq. (38) with respect to a is computed as
f ′(a) =
(ea + 1)[(ea + 1 + 2aea)(ea + ab− 1)− 2a(ea + 1)(ea + b)]
(ea + ab− 1)3 . (39)
Making f ′(a) = 0 is equivalent to make (ea+1+2aea)(ea+ab−1)−2a(ea+1)(ea+
b) = 0. By reduction formula, it gets −a(ea+1− 2aea) · b+ e2a− 4aea− 1 = 0.
Defining b := g(a), g1(a) := a(e
a + 1 − 2aea) and g2(a) := e2a − 4aea − 1, we
have −g1(a) · b + g2(a) = 0 and b = g(a) = g2(a)g1(a) . It can easily compute that
a = 0, 0.7388 are the solutions of g1(a) = 0, and a = 0, 2.177 are the solutions
of g2(a) = 0.
Since a > 0, thus we discuss the sign of f ′(a) in interval (0,+∞) in two cases.
(i) When a < 0.7388, it holds g1(a) > 0 and g2(a) < 0, so we have f
′(a) < 0.
(ii) When a > 0.7388, we can observe by plotting g(a) that g(a) = e
2a−4aea−1
a(ea+1−2aea)
is monotonically decreasing from +∞ to −∞. Thus, there exists one and only
one a∗ > 0.7388 that satisfies b = g2(a
∗)
g1(a∗)
. For 0.7388 < a < a∗, it holds g2(a)g1(a) > b
and g1(a) < 0, so we have f
′(a) < 0. For 0.7388 < a∗ < a, it holds g2(a)g1(a) < b and
g1(a) < 0, thus we have f
′(a) > 0. Combining the above analyses, we finally
derive that f ′(a) < 0 if a ∈ (0, a∗) and f ′(a) > 0 if a ∈ (a∗,+∞). Therefore, it
can conclude that f(a) has the minimum value.
Based on above analysis, the solution a∗ that minimizes the value of Eq. (38)
can be computed by making the derivative of Eq. (38) with respect to a equal to
0. By solving this, we can obtain that 2.177 < a∗ < 2.176 when 0 < b < 10−3.
Note that b denoting 2δ/ǫ is an extremely small value (e.g., b = 2 × 10−6 for
ǫ = 1 and δ = 10−6). Hence, we can take 2.17 as an approximate value of a∗.
Therefore, it holds that the variance (i.e., Eq. (37)) will be smallest when
k = ǫa =
ǫ
2.17 . Thus, it can be known easily that the optimal k is determined
by ǫ/2.17. Specifically, we have (i) if ǫ2.17 ≤ 1, then k = 1; (ii) if ǫ2.17 ≥ d,
then k = d; (iii) 1 < ǫ2.17 < d, then k = ⌊ ǫ2.17⌋ (choosing ⌊ ǫ2.17⌋ is because it
outperforms ⌈ ǫ2.17⌉ through experiments). This completes the proof. 
Lemma 6. Algorithm 3 satisfies (ǫ, δ)-local differential privacy. In addition, for
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any d-dimensional input x ∈ [−1, 1], the perturbed output x∗ holds E[x∗j ] = xj
for all dimension j ∈ [1, d].
Proof. Because Algorithm 3 composes k number of ( ǫk ,
δ
k )-LDP perturbation
algorithms, thus based on composition theorem [35, 33], the Algorithm 3 satisfies
(ǫ, δ)-LDP.
As we can seen from Algorithm 3, each perturbed output x∗j equals to
d
k x¯j
with probability k/d or equals to 0 with probability 1 − k/d. Thus, based on
Lemma 4, it holds E[x∗j ] =
k
d · E[ dk x¯j ] = E[x¯j ] = xj . 
Theorem 5. For any j ∈ [1, d], let Zj = 1N
∑N
i=1 x
∗
j (i) and Xj =
1
N
∑N
i=1 xj(i).
The Algorithm 3 holds that with at least 1− β probability,
max
j∈[1,d]
|Zj −Xj| = O
(√
d log(d/β)
(ǫ + 2δ)
√
N
)
. (40)
Proof. For each dimension j ∈ [1, d], we can get |x∗j − xj | ≤ dk e
ǫ/k+1
eǫ/k+2δ/k−1 =
O( kǫ+2δ ) · dk = O( dǫ+2δ ) based on Lemma 6. Besides, from Eq. (37), we have
V ar[x∗j ] =
d
k
(
e
ǫ
k+1
e
ǫ
k + 2δk −1
)2
− x2j = O
(
dk
(ǫ+2δ)2
)
.
Then using the Bernstein inequality (see Definition 4.1 of [12]), we have
P [|Zj −Xj | ≥ λ] = P
[∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
{x∗j (i)− xj(i)}
∣∣∣∣ ≥ nλ
]
= 2 · exp

 −Nλ2
2
N
∑N
i=1 V ar[x
∗
j (i)− xj(i)] +
2
3
λ d
k
e
ǫ
k +1
e
ǫ
k + 2δ
k
−1


= 2 · exp

 −Nλ2
O
(
dk
(ǫ+2δ)2
)
+ λO
(
d
ǫ+2δ
)

 . (41)
Based on the union bound, we have
P
[
max
j∈[1,d]
|Zj −Xj | ≥ λ
]
= P [{|Z1 −X1| ≥ λ} ∪ · · · ∪ {|Zd −Xd| ≥ λ}]
≤
N∑
i=1
P [|Zj −Xj | ≥ λ]
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= 2d · exp

 −nλ2
O
(
dk
(ǫ+2δ)2
)
+ λO
(
d
ǫ+2δ
)

 .
To ensure that max
j∈[1,d]
|Zj − Xj | < λ holds with at least 1 − β probability, it
suffices to enforce
2d · exp

 −nλ2
O
(
dk
(ǫ+2δ)2
)
+ λO
(
d
ǫ+2δ
)

 = β. (42)
Solving Eq. (42), we obtain λ = O
(√
dk log(d/β)
(ǫ+2δ)
√
N
)
, where k is determined by
Lemma 5. Since asymptotic expressions involving ǫ→ 0, λ can also be written
as O
(√
d log(d/β)
(ǫ+2δ)
√
N
)
. 
4.3. Comparison with Related Work
For collecting multi-dimensional numeric data, Duchi et al. [16] propose to
perturb multi-dimensional numeric data under ǫ-LDP, which provides strong
privacy guarantees and asymptotic error bound, but remains (ǫ, δ)-LDP un-
solved. Inspired by Duchi et al.’s solution [16], we firstly introduce Algorithm 1
which focuses on achieving (ǫ, δ)-LDP with high data utility when handling
multi-dimensional numeric data. However, Duchi et al.’s solution is sophisti-
cated when handling multi-dimensional data. Afterward, Nguyeˆn et al. [39]
proposed Harmony to only sample one dimensional data to perturb, which is
simpler and achieves the optimal asymptotic error bound as [16]. Similar but
differently, Wang et al.’s [46] propose to uniformly select k dimensions from d,
which also yields optimal asymptotic error bound. However, both [39] and [46]
only achieve ǫ-LDP and cannot handle the case of (ǫ, δ)-LDP. In this paper, our
proposed Algorithm 3 focuses on achieving (ǫ, δ)-LDP while ensuring high data
utility. Particularly, following the idea of [46], our proposed Algorithm 3 re-
quires each user to randomized report only k attributes that uniformly selected
from d attributes, which in turn reduces the total noise variance.
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5. Frequency Estimation for Categorical Attributes under (ǫ, δ)-LDP
This section will investigate the mechanismsM to achieve (ǫ, δ)-local differ-
ential privacy for categorical attributes, supporting accurate frequency estima-
tions of each possible value in each categorical attribute’s domain.
So far most existing algorithms [21, 32, 5, 49, 48, 50] are designed for estimat-
ing the frequencies of categorical attributes while ensuring ǫ-LDP. Wang et al.
[48] have introduced a framework for pure LDP which can be used to analyze
and optimize different ǫ-LDP protocols. They also proposed the optimized local
hashing protocol to ensure better data utility under LDP. In this section, we
firstly extend their framework for approximate LDP (e.g., (ǫ, δ)-LDP) and then
analyze and optimize different (ǫ, δ)-LDP protocols for frequencies estimations
of categorical attributes.
Definition 3 ((ǫ, δ)-LDP Protocols). Consider two probabilities p > q. A local
protocol given by M such that a user reports the true value with probability p
and reports each of other values with probability q, will satisfy (ǫ, δ)-LDP if and
only if it holds p ≤ q · eǫ + δ.
We now consider that each ofN users independently executes the mechanism
in Definition 3. In this context, from Theorem 2 of [48], the variance for the
number of times that the true value occurs among N users’ noisy values will be
Var =
Nq(1− q)
(p− q)2 +
Nfv(1 − p− q)
p− q , (43)
where fv is the frequency of the value v ∈ [1, k]. Moreover, the variance of
Eq. (43) will be dominated by the first term when fv is small. Hence, the
approximation of the variance in Eq. (43) is denoted as
Var∗ =
Nq(1− q)
(p− q)2 . (44)
In addition, it also holds Var∗=Var when p+ q = 1.
Recall the problem statement in Section 3, for a categorical attribute with
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domain {1, 2, · · · , k}, we use [1, k] to denote the domain set {1, 2, · · · , k}. Then,
based on Definition 3 and the existing ǫ-LDP protocols, we will focus on propos-
ing local algorithms under (ǫ, δ)-LDP in the following.
General Randomized Response under Approximate LDP (GRR-
ALDP). General randomized response [32] reports the true value with proba-
bility p, while reporting each incorrect value with probability q = 1−pk−1 . Thus,
in order to make GRR-ALDP meet (ǫ, δ)-LDP with p ≤ q · eǫ + δ, a general
randomized local protocolM is required to output the perturbed value y when
given any input value v ∈ [1, k] with the following distributions:
P [M(v) = y] =


p = e
ǫ+(k−1)δ
eǫ+k−1 , if y = v,
q = 1−δeǫ+k−1 , if y 6= v.
(45)
Then, by plugging p and q in Eq. (45) into Eq. (44), the variance of GRR-
ALDP is
Var∗GRR-ALDP =
N(eǫ + k − 2 + δ)(1 − δ)
(eǫ + kδ − 1)2 . (46)
Parallel Randomized Response [21] under Approximate LDP (PRR-
ALDP) first encodes the value v ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} into a length-k binary vector
B where the v-th bit is 1, that is B = [0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0]. Then, PRR-ALDP
perturbs each bit of B with the following probability distribution
P [B∗[i] = 1] =


p, if B[i] = 1,
q, if B[i] = 0,
(47)
where p > q.
Based on Eq. (47), for any inputs v1 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} and v2 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k},
and output B∗, it holds
P [B∗|v1] ≤ P [B∗|v2] + δ
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⇒
∏
i∈[k]
P [B∗[i]|v1] ≤
∏
i∈[k]
P [B∗[i]|v2] + δ
⇒


P [B∗[v1] = 0|v1] · P [B∗[v2] = 0|v1] ≤ P [B∗[v1] = 0|v2] · P [B∗[v2] = 0|v2] + δ,
P [B∗[v1] = 0|v1] · P [B∗[v2] = 1|v1] ≤ P [B∗[v1] = 0|v2] · P [B∗[v2] = 1|v2] + δ,
P [B∗[v1] = 1|v1] · P [B∗[v2] = 0|v1] ≤ P [B∗[v1] = 1|v2] · P [B∗[v2] = 0|v2] + δ,
P [B∗[v1] = 1|v1] · P [B∗[v2] = 1|v1] ≤ P [B∗[v1] = 1|v2] · P [B∗[v2] = 1|v2] + δ
⇒ p · (1− q) ≤ eǫ · q · (1− p) + δ (This last step uses p > q). (48)
Therefore, PRR-ALDP will satisfy (ǫ, δ)-LDP if and only if Inequality (48) holds.
Letting the equal sign in (48) hold, we set p as follows:
p =
qeǫ + δ
1− q + qeǫ . (49)
Applying Eq. (49) to Eq. (44), we obtain
Var∗PRR-ALDP =
Nq(1− q)(1 − q + qeǫ)2
[q(1 − q)(eǫ − 1) + δ]2 . (50)
Symmetric PRR-ALDP (SPRR-ALDP). In RAPPOR [21], it chooses
p and q such that p + q = 1, leading to a symmetric perturbation on 1 and 0.
Based on this observation and Eq. (49), we derive
p =
eǫ −√eǫ(1 − δ) + δ
eǫ − 1 , q =
√
eǫ(1− δ) + δ − 1
eǫ − 1 . (51)
Then, the variance is
Var∗SPRR-ALDP =
N(
√
eǫ(1− δ) + δ − 1)(eǫ −√eǫ(1− δ) + δ)
(eǫ − 2√eǫ(1− δ) + δ + 1)2 . (52)
Local Hashing under Approximate LDP (LH-ALDP) first hashes the
input value into a domain [g] such that g < k, and then perturbs the hashed
value by the PRR-ALDP algorithm. Denote H as the universal hash function
family such that each hash function H ∈ H hashes each input value into a value
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in [g]. Based on [48], the universal property requires that
∀v1, v2 ∈ [k], v1 6= v2 : P
H∈H
[H(v1) = H(v2)] ≤ 1
g
. (53)
Given any input value v ∈ [k], LH-ALDP first outputs a value in [g] by
hashing, that is x = H(v). Then, LH-ALDP perturbs x with the following
distribution
∀i ∈ [g],P [y = i] =


p = e
ǫ+(g−1)δ
eǫ+g−1 , if x = i,
q = 1−δeǫ+g−1 , if x 6= i.
(54)
Based on Eq. (54), we can know that LH-ALDP satisfies (ǫ, δ)-LDP since it
holds p ≤ qeǫ + δ.
Then, while aggregating in the server, it holds that
p∗ = p, q∗ =
1
g
p+
g − 1
g
q =
1
g
. (55)
Thus, by taking p = p∗ and q = q∗ into Eq. (43), the variance of LH-ALDP is
Var∗LH-ALDP =
N(eǫ + g − 1)2
(g − 1)(eǫ + gδ − 1)2 . (56)
Optimized LH-ALDP (OLH-ALDP). As it can seen from Eq. (56), we
can minimize the variance of LH-ALDP by making the partial derivative of
Eq. (56) with respect to g equal to 0. That is, it needs to solve the following
equation:
− δ2 · g3 − 3(eǫ − 1)δ2 · g2 + [(eǫ − 1)2 + 2(eǫ − 1)δ(δ − 2eǫ + 1)] · g
+ (eǫ − 1)2(2δ − eǫ − 1) = 0. (57)
Hence, the optimal g is the solution to the cubic Eq. (57), that is,
g =
−3eǫδ −√eǫ − 1√(1− δ)(eǫ + δ − 9eǫδ − 1) + eǫ + 3δ − 1
2δ
.
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Figure 2: The noise variances of mechanisms under (ǫ, δ)-LDP for categorical attributes versus
ǫ when δ = 10−6
Optimal Gaussian Mechanism (Opt-GM). When applying Gaussian
mechanism on categorical attributes, an input value v ∈ [1, k] is also encoded
into a length-k binary vector B firstly. The vector B has the same properties
as described in PRR-ALDP.
After encoding v into a vector B, the Opt-GM will output the noisy vector
B∗ such that each B∗[i] is obtained by perturbing B[i] ∈ {0, 1} via adding
noise with a Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2), where σ is computed by Eq. (4).
And ℓ2-sensitivity is
√
2 since the binary vectors of two different input v and v′
differ only in two bits. After collecting the noisy vectors from N users (B∗(j)
for user j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}), the aggregator simply computes ∑Nj=1 B∗(j)[v] as
the count for v (if the result is not an integer, rounding can be applied; and a
negative result can be considered as 0). Although this method seems naive, its
performance is not terrible due to large N as shown in our experiments later. If
we ignore the effect of rounding, the variance of Opt-GM is Var∗Opt-GM = Nσ
2.
We compare the variance of the above mechanisms as shown in Fig. 2. For
GRR-ALDP, the domain is set as k = 2, 10, 100, respectively. It can be seen
that the size of domain k has a big impact on the variance of GRR-ALDP when
the privacy protection level is high (i.e., the ǫ is small), that is a larger domain
k leads to a bigger variance. And this impact can be relatively eliminated under
low privacy protection level (e.g., when ǫ = 10). In particular, GRR-ALDP has
the smallest variance among all mechanisms when k = 2. Overall, it shows that
GRR-ALDP will be more appropriate when k is small or when ǫ is extremely
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large.
In addition, we can observe that Opt-GM relatively has the biggest variance
when compared with SPRR-ALDP and OLH-ALDP. Besides, the variance of
SPRR-ALDP and OLH-ALDP are very close to each other when ǫ is small
(i.e., when ǫ ≤ 1). And the OLH-ALDP will outperform SPRR-ALDP when ǫ
becomes bigger (i.e., when ǫ > 1). Therefore, to sum up, OLH-ALDP is always
better than SPRR-ALDP and Opt-GM in a wide range of ǫ. Moreover, OLH-
ALDP is more applicable than GRR-ALDP in practical since the performance
of the latter mechanism is overly dependent on the size of the domain.
6. Experiments
In this section, we evaluated the performance of our proposed mechanisms
by using two public datasets (denoted as BR and MX) which contain census
records from Brazil and Mexico, both extracted from the Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series2. Both BR and MX have 4M tuples (e.g., users). Specifically,
BR contains 16 attributes of which 6 are numeric attributes (e.g., income) and
10 are categorical attributes (e.g., gender); and MX contains 19 attributes of
which 5 are numeric attributes and 14 are categorical attributes. Without loss of
generality, we normalize the data domain of each numeric attribute into [−1, 1].
As mentioned before, we demonstrate the accuracy of our proposed mecha-
nisms from two perspectives, that is, (i) the accuracy on mean/frequency estima-
tion and (ii) the accuracy on building machine learning models. We implement
all algorithms and experiments using Python 2.7, running on a Windows 10 PC
with Intel Xeon E5-1650 3.20 GHz CPU and 16G RAM.
6.1. Results on Mean/Frequency Estimation
In our first experimental settings, we consider the scenario that each user
reports her/his multi-dimensional data tuple based on local differential privacy
mechanisms and then the server collects and aggregates all the perturbed data
2https://www.ipums.org
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Figure 3: Accuracy for mean estimation on numeric attributes.
and computes the estimations of the mean value for numeric attributes and the
frequency value for categorical attributes. In particular, to show the accuracy
of our proposed mechanisms, we evaluate the mean square error (MSE) of the
estimated mean values for numeric attributes and frequencies for categorical
attributes.
The accuracy for mean estimation on numeric attributes varying form dif-
ferent privacy parameters on both datasets MX and BR is shown in Fig. 3.
On the whole, it can be seen that both our proposed two mechanisms signifi-
cantly outperform the optimal Gaussian mechanism (i.e., Opt-GM) in all cases
under (ǫ, δ)-LDP. And the MSE of Mechanism-1 and Mechanism-2 is close
to each other and much smaller than Opt-GM. This is because Mechanism-1
and Mechanism-2 are unbiased estimations on mean values, thus holding much
smaller variances than Opt-GM. Besides, Figs. 3(a) and (b) indicate the larger
the privacy budget ǫ is, the lower MSE will be. In addition, it can be seen again
from Figs. 3(c) and (d) that Opt-GM always has the biggest MSE among three
mechanisms. With the increase of δ, we can observe that the MSE of Opt-GM
decreases gradually, while the MSEs of Mechanism-1 and Mechanism-2 are al-
most unchanged. This indicates the size of the privacy parameter δ has little
impact on the accuracies of Mechanism-1 and Mechanism-2.
Furthermore, we also conduct extensive experiments on synthetic datasets
to compare the effects of different parameters, i.e., privacy parameters ǫ and δ,
dimension d. Specifically, each synthetic dataset contains 400, 000 tuples and
is generated from a Gaussian distribution N (0, 1/16) with mean value 0 and
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Figure 4: Accuracy for mean estimation on synthetic dataset under different dimensions
(δ = 10−6), each of which follows a Gaussian distribution N (0, 1/16).
variance 1/16. We consider four synthetic datasets with different dimension in
our experiments, i.e., d = 1, 5, 10, 15.
Fig. 4 presents the accuracies of mean estimation on synthetic datasets vary-
ing from different privacy budgets ǫ and different dimensions d. It can be seen
from all figures that Mechanism-1 and Mechanism-2 hold much higher accuracy
than Opt-GM in all cases. By comparing four figures in Fig. 4, the MSEs of all
mechanisms will increase when the dimension d increases from 1 to 15. Nonethe-
less, the MSEs of our proposed Mechanism-1 and Mechanism-2 increase much
lower than that of Opt-GM. This demonstrates that our proposed Mechanism-1
and Mechanism-2 have better scalability for dimensions, which are more prac-
tical in reality.
In addition, Fig. 5 shows the accuracy of mean estimation for numeric at-
tributes on synthetic datasets varying from different privacy parameters δ and
different dimensions d. It can be seen that the MSE of Opt-GM will decrease
with the increasing of privacy parameter δ. However, the MSEs of Mechanism-1
and Mechanism-2 are hardly affected by privacy parameter δ. By comparing the
four figures in Fig. 5, we can find that the MSEs of our proposed Mechanism-1
and Mechanism-2 increase much slower than that of Opt-GM with the increas-
ing of dimension d. Therefore, it demonstrates again that our proposed two
mechanisms have better data utility with high scalability for dimensions.
As for categorical attributes, Fig. 6 shows the accuracy of the frequency
estimation of different mechanisms varying from different privacy parameters.
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Figure 5: Accuracy for mean estimation on synthetic dataset under different dimensions
(ǫ = 1), each of which follows a Gaussian distribution N (0, 1/16).
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Figure 6: Accuracy for frequency estimation on categorical attributes.
On the whole, the MSEs of four mechanisms decrease with an increase of ǫ
from 0.1 to 10. Among four mechanisms ensuring (ǫ, δ)-LDP for categorical
attributes, it can be seen that OLH-ALDP has the lowest MSE (e.g., the best
data utility) in all cases, which corresponds to theoretical analysis. In addition,
by comparing Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(b) (or, Fig. 6(c) and Fig. 6(d)), the MSEs
of four mechanisms are almost unchanged when δ changes from 10−6 to 10−7.
That is, the size of the privacy parameter ǫ primarily dominants the accuracy,
while the size of the privacy parameter δ has a small effect on the accuracy.
In addition, we also implement different algorithms on synthetic datasets
to compare the effects of the domain of categorical attributes. Each synthetic
dataset is generated by following Zipf’s distribution with an exponent parameter
s=1.3 and each synthetic dataset contains 100,000 records.
Fig. 7 shows the accuracy of frequency estimation for categorical attributes
on synthetic datasets varying from different domain size k. It can be seen that
the MSEs of Opt-GM, SPRR-ALDP, and OLH-ALDP almost remain unchanged
with the increasing of domain size k in all cases. This is reasonable because these
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Figure 7: Accuracy for frequency estimation on synthetic data vary domain k, each of which
follows Zipf’s distribution with exponent s=1.3.
three methods are not relevant to the domain size in theory. In contrast, the
domain size has a great impact on the MSE of GRR-ALDP. The larger the
domain size is, the larger the MSE will be. This shows that GRR-ALDP leads
to a low data utility for the categorical attributes that have large domain sizes,
thus resulting in limited applications in reality.
Furthermore, we can see from Fig. 7(a) and Fig. 7(c) that the growth of MSE
of GRR-ALDP are slower when privacy budget ǫ = 0.5. And the MSE of GRR-
ALDP increases much quickly when privacy budget ǫ = 5, as shown in Fig. 7(b)
and Fig. 7(d). This shows that the domain size will have a greater impact on the
data utility when the privacy budget is relatively large. Thus, it demonstrates
again that the data utility of GRR-ALDP suffers from both privacy parameters
and domain size, leading a low data utility and poor availability. In contrast,
the accuracies of both SPRR-ALDP and OLH-ALDP are much smaller in all
cases and are minimally affected by the domain size.
6.2. Results on Machine Learning Models
In the second experimental setting, we build a class of machine learning
models under (ǫ, δ)-LDP which are solved by stochastic gradient descent (SGD)
[46]. We focus on three common learning tasks: linear regression, logistic regres-
sion, and support vector machines (SVM) classification. We take the numeric
attribute “income” as the label attribute in three tasks. In our experiments,
each categorical attribute Aj with k values is transformed into k− 1 bit binary
values with domain {−1, 1} such that each new binary vector satisfies that, (i)
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Figure 8: Accuracy of linear regression.
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Figure 9: Accuracy of logistic regression.
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Figure 10: Accuracy of SVM classification.
the l-th bit is set to 1 and the other k − 2 bit are set to -1 for all l-th (l < k)
value of Aj ; (ii) all k − 1 bit are set to -1 for all k-th value of Aj . Then, the
new datasets of BR and MX contain 42 and 85 dimensions, respectively. And
for logistic regression and SVM classification, we process “income” into binary
values such that the value larger than the mean is set to 1, and -1 otherwise.
Note that one tuple may be used in multiple iterations in the learning al-
gorithms under non-private cases. However, the works [39, 46] have indicated
that it will degrade the accuracy of the learning algorithms by iterating one
tuple multiple times in the local private setting. Therefore, in the local private
setting of SGD for machine learning, we assume each user (i.e., one tuple) only
participates in at most one iteration. In each iteration, each user in one batch
submits her noisy gradient to the aggregator. Then, the learning parameters
will be updated by using Eq. (3).
Fig. 8 shows the mean squared error (MSE) of different mechanisms on the
linear regression model varying values of privacy budget ǫ from 0.1 to 10. Note
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that we set δ = 10−26 under MX dataset and δ = 10−13 under BR dataset
in order to ensure α < 1. It can been seen that our proposed Mechanism-1
and Mechanism-2 outperform Opt-GM in all case. This demonstrates that our
proposed local differential privacy algorithms can ensure much lower errors than
the optimal Gaussian mechanism when applying on the linear regression model.
Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 present the misclassification rate of different mechanisms
on logistic regression model and SVM classification model, respectively. We can
observe from both figures that, with varying values of privacy budget ǫ from
0.1 to 10, our proposed two mechanisms always have a smaller misclassification
rate than Opt-GM. Besides, the misclassification rates of our proposed mech-
anisms are close to that of the non-private method. In particular, when ǫ is
large (i.e., ǫ ≥ 5), the accuracy of Mechanism-1 and Mechanism-2 approach to
the non-private case, which demonstrates the high data utility of our proposed
mechanism again.
7. Conclusion
This paper investigates the multi-dimensional data collection and analy-
sis with (ǫ, δ)-local differential privacy under untrusted data curator. Aiming
at both numeric data and categorical data, we have proposed novel solutions
which can not only collect each user’s data record in a randomized way to
provide strong privacy guarantees, but also compute accurate statistics such
that ensuring high accuracies on both mean/frequency estimation and machine
learning models such as linear regression, logistic regression and SVM classifi-
cation. Moreover, the theoretical analysis has shown that our solutions achieve
low asymptotic error bound and the minimum variance. Extensive experimental
results on real data and synthetic data have demonstrated the high accuracy
of our proposed solutions on both simple data statistics and complex machine
learning models.
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Appendix A. Appendix
Appendix A.1. Proof of Duchi et al.’s Solution for Multi-dimensional Data
Algorithm 4 presents Duchi et al.’s mechanism for achieving ǫ-LDP for multi-
dimensional data. Actually, B is the scaling factor that can ensure the expected value
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of noisy data is the same as the original data. Before choosing B, we first compute Cd
as
Cd =


2d−1, if d is odd,
2d−1 − 1
2
(
d
d/2
)
, otherwise.
(A.1)
Then, B is calculated by
B =


2d+Cd·(e
ǫ−1)
( d−1(d−1)/2)·(eǫ−1)
, if d is odd,
2d+Cd·(e
ǫ−1)
(d−1d/2)·(eǫ−1)
, otherwise.
(A.2)
Nguyeˆn et al. [39] have shown that Duchi et al.’s solution (i.e., Algorithm 4)
doesn’t guarantee local differential privacy when d is even. However, they don’t give
the specific proofs. In the following, we will prove that Algorithm 4 satisfies local
differential privacy when d is odd and Algorithm 4 doesn’t satisfy local differential
privacy when d is even.
To achieve ǫ-local differential privacy, it needs to guarantee P[M(x) = x∗] ≤
eǫ · P[M(x′) = x∗]. Based on Lemma 2, we have
α
|T+|
≤
1− α
|T−|
· eǫ. (A.3)
By combining (9), (11) and (A.3), it will obtain
α ≤


eǫ
eǫ+1
, if d is odd,
|T+|·eǫ
|T+|·eǫ+|T−| , if d is even.
(A.4)
Therefore, as we can see, when d is odd, Algorithm 4 satisfies ǫ-local differential
privacy. But when d is even, Algorithm 4 doesn’t satisfy ǫ-local differential privacy
since the probability of Bernoulli variable u = 1 is no longer equal to e
ǫ
eǫ+1
.
Appendix A.2. Proof of Fixing Duchi et al.’s Mechanism to Satisfy LDP when
d is Even
Nguyeˆn et al. [39] have proposed one possible solution to fix the Algorithm 4 to
satisfy LDP while d is even. Their method is to re-define a Bernoulli variable u such
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Algorithm 4: Duchi et al.’s solution [16] for Multidimensional Data
Input: tuple x ∈ [−1, 1]d and privacy parameter ǫ and δ
Output: tuple x∗ ∈ {−B,B}d
1 Generate a random vector V := [V1, V2, . . . , Vd] ∈ {−1, 1}
d by sampling each Vj
independently from the following distribution:
P[Vj = vj ] =
{
1
2
+ 1
2
xj , if vj = 1
1
2
− 1
2
xj , if vj = −1
2 In the case of V is sampled as v, let T+(v) (resp. T−(v)) be the set of all
tuples x∗ ∈ {−B,B}d such that x∗ · v > 0 (resp. x∗ · v ≤ 0);
3 Sample a Bernoulli variable u = 1 with probability e
ǫ
eǫ+1
;
4 if u = 1 then
5 return a tuple x∗ uniformly from T+(v);
6 else
7 return a tuple x∗ uniformly from T−(v);
that
P [u = 1] =
eǫ · Cd
(eǫ − 1)Cd + 2d
. (A.5)
Note that Eq. (A.5) only fix the Algorithm 4 with the situation that T+ (resp, T−)
is the set of all tuples x∗ ∈ {−B,B}d such that x∗ · v > 0 (resp. x∗ · v ≤ 0). And the
proof of Eq. (A.5) is not given. Thus, in the following, we will firstly show the proof
of Eq. (A.5), and then propose the solution to fix the Algorithm 4 with the situation
that T+ (resp, T−) is the set of all tuples x∗ ∈ {−B,B}d such that x∗ · v ≥ 0 (resp.
x∗ · v < 0). Note that only when d is even, Algorithm 4 violates LDP. Thus, without
generality, d is always even and we will no longer specify this in this subsection.
Proof of Eq. (A.5). Referring to Appendix Appendix A.1, to achieve ǫ-LDP, the
probability of a Bernoulli variable u = 1 should be
α ≤
|T+| · eǫ
|T+| · eǫ + |T−|
. (A.6)
From Eq. (12), it holds
∣∣T+∣∣ = (2d − ( d
d/2
))
/2 and
∣∣T−∣∣ = (2d + ( d
d/2
))
/2. Thus,
Eq. (A.6) can be re-written as
α ≤
2d−( dd/2)
2
e−ǫ ·
2d+( dd/2)
2
+
2d−( dd/2)
2
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=
eǫ[2d −
(
d
d/2
)
]
2d +
(
d
d/2
)
+ eǫ[2d −
(
d
d/2
)
]
=
eǫ · Cd
(eǫ − 1)Cd + 2d
. (A.7)
Therefore, we have proved that Algorithm 4 can achieve ǫ-LDP when d is even as long
as the probability of a Bernoulli variable u = 1 is e
ǫ·Cd
(eǫ−1)Cd+2
d . 
As mentioned before, Eq. (A.5) can fix Algorithm 4 only when T+ (resp, T−) is
the set of all tuples x∗ ∈ {−B,B}d such that x∗ · v > 0 (resp. x∗ · v ≤ 0). In this
paper, we have proposed the solution to fix Algorithm 4 when T+ (resp, T−) is the set
of all tuples x∗ ∈ {−B,B}d such that x∗ · v ≥ 0 (resp. x∗ · v < 0), that is re-defining
a Bernoulli variable u such that
P [u = 1] =
eǫ(2d − Cd)
eǫ(2d − Cd) +Cd
. (A.8)
Proof of Eq. (A.8). When d is even and T+ (resp, T−) is the set of all tuples
x∗ ∈ {−B,B}d such that x∗ · v ≥ 0 (resp. x∗ · v < 0), it holds


∣∣T+∣∣ =∑j≥d/2 (dj),∣∣T−∣∣ =∑j≤d/2−1 (dj).
(A.9)
From Eq. (A.9), it holds
∣∣T+∣∣ + ∣∣T−∣∣ = 2d and ∣∣T+∣∣ − ∣∣T−∣∣ = ( d
d/2
)
. Then, we get∣∣T+∣∣ = (2d + ( d
d/2
))
/2 and
∣∣T−∣∣ = (2d − ( d
d/2
))
/2. Thus, Eq. (A.6) can be re-written
as
α ≤
2d+( dd/2)
2
e−ǫ ·
2d−( dd/2)
2
+
2d+( dd/2)
2
=
eǫ[2d +
(
d
d/2
)
]
2d −
(
d
d/2
)
+ eǫ[2d +
(
d
d/2
)
]
=
eǫ(2d − Cd)
eǫ(2d − Cd) + Cd
. (A.10)
This has completed the proof that Algorithm 4 can achieve ǫ-LDP when d is even as
long as the probability of a Bernoulli variable u = 1 is e
ǫ(2d−Cd)
eǫ(2d−Cd)+Cd
. 
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Appendix A.3. Proof of Unbiased Estimation
Based on Algorithm 1, the expectation of M(x) is computed as
E[M(x)] =
∑
x∗∈{−B,B}d
{x∗P[M(x) = x∗]} . (A.11)
For k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}, the k-th dimension of E[M(x)] is
∑
x∗∈{−B,B}d:
x∗
k
=B
{B · P[M(x) = x∗]}+
∑
x∗∈{−B,B}d:
x∗
k
=−B
{(−B) · P[M(x) = x∗]} . (A.12)
To consider k = 1, the first dimension of E[M(x)] is
∑
x∗∈{−B,B}d:
x∗1=B
{B · P[M(x) = x∗]}+
∑
x∗∈{−B,B}d:
x∗1=−B
{(−B) · P[M(x) = x∗]}
= B
{[ ∑
x∗
2:d
∈{−B,B}d−1
P[M(x) = [B, x∗2:d]]
]
−
[ ∑
x∗
2:d
∈{−B,B}d−1
P[M(x) = [−B, x∗2:d]]
]}
.
(A.13)
From Eq. (A.13), defining J(x2:d, v2:d) =
∏d
j=2
(
1
2
+ 1
2
xj · vj
)
, it will have
∑
x∗
2:d
∈{−B,B}d−1
P[M(x) = [B, x∗2:d]] =
∑
x∗
2:d
∈{−B,B}d−1
{[
α
|T+|
×
∑
v∈{−1,1}d :
x∗·v>0,x∗1=B
(
1
2
+
1
2
x1 · v1
)
J(x2:d, v2:d)
]
+
[
1− α
|T−|
×
∑
v∈{−1,1}d:
x∗·v≤0,x∗1=B
(
1
2
+
1
2
x1 · v1
)
J(x2:d, v2:d)
]}
, (A.14)
where
∑
v∈{−1,1}d:
x∗·v>0,x∗1=B
(
1
2
+
1
2
x1 · v1
) d∏
j=2
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)
=
∑
v∈{−1,1}d:
x∗·v>0,x∗
1
=B,v1=1
(
1
2
+
1
2
x1 · v1
) d∏
j=2
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)
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+
∑
v∈{−1,1}d:
x∗·v>0,x∗1=B,v1=−1
(
1
2
+
1
2
x1 · v1
) d∏
j=2
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)
=
(
1
2
+
1
2
x1
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d>−B
d∏
j=2
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)
+
(
1
2
−
1
2
x1
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d>B
d∏
j=2
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)
, (A.15)
and
∑
v∈{−1,1}d:
x∗·v≤0,x∗
1
=B
(
1
2
+
1
2
x1 · v1
) d∏
j=2
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)
=
∑
v∈{−1,1}d:
x∗·v≤0,x∗1=B,v1=1
(
1
2
+
1
2
x1 · v1
) d∏
j=2
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)
+
∑
v∈{−1,1}d:
x∗·v≤0,x∗
1
=B,v1=−1
(
1
2
+
1
2
x1 · v1
) d∏
j=2
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)
=
(
1
2
+
1
2
x1
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d≤−B
d∏
j=2
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)
+
(
1
2
−
1
2
x1
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d≤B
d∏
j=2
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)
. (A.16)
Therefore, Eq. (A.14) can be deduced as
∑
x∗
2:d
∈{−B,B}d−1
P[M(x) = [B, x∗2:d]] =
∑
x∗
2:d
∈{−B,B}d−1
{[
α
|T+|
×
((
1
2
+
1
2
x1
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d>−B
J(x2:d, v2:d)
+
(
1
2
−
1
2
x1
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d>B
J(x2:d, v2:d)
)]
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+[
1− α
|T−|
×
((
1
2
+
1
2
x1
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d≤−B
J(x2:d, v2:d)
+
(
1
2
−
1
2
x1
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d≤B
J(x2:d, v2:d)
)]}
. (A.17)
Similarly, it also holds that
∑
x∗
2:d
∈{−B,B}d−1
P[M(x) = [−B, x∗2:d]] =
∑
x∗
2:d
∈{−B,B}d−1
{[
α
|T+|
×
((
1
2
+
1
2
x1
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d>B
J(x2:d, v2:d)
+
(
1
2
−
1
2
x1
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d>−B
J(x2:d, v2:d)
)]
+
[
1− α
|T−|
×
((
1
2
+
1
2
x1
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d≤B
J(x2:d, v2:d)
+
(
1
2
−
1
2
x1
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d≤−B
J(x2:d, v2:d)
)]}
. (A.18)
The first dimension of E[M(x)] dividing B is
[ ∑
x∗
2:d
∈{−B,B}d−1
P[M(x) = [B, x∗2:d]]
]
−
[ ∑
x∗
2:d
∈{−B,B}d−1
P[M(x) = [−B, x∗2:d]]
]
=
∑
x∗
2:d
∈{−B,B}d−1
{[
α
|T+|
×
((
1
2
+
1
2
x1
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d>−B
J(x2:d, v2:d)
+
(
1
2
−
1
2
x1
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d>B
J(x2:d, v2:d)
)]
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+[
1− α
|T−|
×
((
1
2
+
1
2
x1
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d≤−B
J(x2:d, v2:d)
+
(
1
2
−
1
2
x1
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d≤B
J(x2:d, v2:d)
)]}
−
∑
x∗
2:d
∈{−B,B}d−1
{[
α
|T+|
×
((
1
2
+
1
2
x1
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d>B
J(x2:d, v2:d)
+
(
1
2
−
1
2
x1
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d>−B
J(x2:d, v2:d)
)]
+
[
1− α
|T−|
×
((
1
2
+
1
2
x1
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d≤B
J(x2:d, v2:d)
+
(
1
2
−
1
2
x1
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d≤−B
J(x2:d, v2:d)
)]}
=
∑
x∗
2:d
∈{−B,B}d−1
{[
α
|T+|
×
((
1
2
+
1
2
x1
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
−B<x∗
2:d
·v2:d≤B
J(x2:d, v2:d)
−
(
1
2
−
1
2
x1
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
−B<x∗
2:d
·v2:d≤B
J(x2:d, v2:d)
)]
+
[
1− α
|T−|
×
(
−
(
1
2
+
1
2
x1
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
−B<x∗
2:d
·v2:d≤B
J(x2:d, v2:d)
+
(
1
2
−
1
2
x1
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
−B<x∗
2:d
·v2:d≤B
J(x2:d, v2:d)
)]}
=
∑
x∗
2:d
∈{−B,B}d−1
{[
α
|T+|
× x1
∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
−B<x∗
2:d
·v2:d≤B
J(x2:d, v2:d)
]
+
[
1− α
|T−|
×
(
− x1
∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
−B<x∗
2:d
·v2:d≤B
J(x2:d, v2:d)
}
= x1
(
α
|T+|
−
1− α
|T−|
)
×
∑
x∗
2:d
∈{−B,B}d−1
∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
−B<x∗
2:d
·v2:d≤B
J(x2:d, v2:d). (A.19)
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To ensure that the first dimension of E[M(x)] equals x1, we set B as
[(
α
|T+|
−
1− α
|T−|
)
×H
]−1
, (A.20)
where
H =
∑
x∗
2:d
∈{−B,B}d−1
∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
−B<x∗
2:d
·v2:d≤B
d∏
j=2
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)
=


∑
x∗
2:d
∈{−B,B}d−1
∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d=0
d∏
j=2
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)
,
if d is odd,
∑
x∗
2:d
∈{−B,B}d−1
∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d=B
d∏
j=2
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)
,
if d is even.
(A.21)
If d is odd, then we have
∑
x∗
2:d
∈{−B,B}d−1
∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d=0
d∏
j=2
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)
=
∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}
d−1
∑
x∗
2:d
∈{−B,B}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d=0
d∏
j=2
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)
=
∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}
d−1
[(
d− 1
d−1
2
)
d∏
j=2
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)]
=
(
d− 1
d−1
2
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}
d−1
d∏
j=2
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)
=
(
d− 1
d−1
2
)
d∏
j=2
[(
1
2
+
1
2
xj
)
+
(
1
2
−
1
2
xj
)]
=
(
d− 1
d−1
2
)
d∏
j=2
1 =
(
d− 1
d−1
2
)
. (A.22)
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If d is even, then we have
∑
x∗
2:d
∈{−B,B}d−1
∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d=B
d∏
j=2
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)
=
∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}
d−1
∑
x∗
2:d
∈{−B,B}d−1:
x∗
2:d
·v2:d=B
d∏
j=2
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)
=
∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}
d−1
[(
d− 1
d
2
)
d∏
j=2
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)]
=
(
d− 1
d
2
) ∑
v2:d∈{−1,1}
d−1
d∏
j=2
(
1
2
+
1
2
xj · vj
)
=
(
d− 1
d
2
)
d∏
j=2
[(
1
2
+
1
2
xj
)
+
(
1
2
−
1
2
xj
)]
=
(
d− 1
d
2
)
d∏
j=2
1 =
(
d− 1
d
2
)
. (A.23)
Therefore, the above result in Eq. (A.21) equals
H =


(
d−1
(d−1)/2
)
, if d is odd,(
d−1
d/2
)
, if d is even.
(A.24)
Thus, the B can be calculated as
B =


[(
α
|T+|
− 1−α
|T−|
) (d−1
d−1
2
)]−1
, if d is odd,[(
α
|T+|
− 1−α
|T−|
) (d−1
d
2
)]−1
, if d is even.
(A.25)
Since




|T+| = 2d−1,
|T−| = 2d−1,
if d is odd,


|T+| = 2d−1 − 1
2
(
d
d/2
)
,
|T−| = 2d−1 + 1
2
(
d
d/2
)
,
if d is even,
(A.26)
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based on Eq. (23), we can obtain
B =


2d+Cd·(e
ǫ−1)
( d−1(d−1)/2)·(eǫ+2d·δ−1)
, if d is odd,
2d+Cd·(e
ǫ−1)
(d−1d/2)·(eǫ+2d·δ−1)
, if d is even.
(A.27)
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